As the world’s security landscape changes, space is no longer seen simply as a domain for research and commerce, but also as a central pillar of Germany’s national security and military deterrence.
According to the Inspector of Cyber and Information Domain of the German Armed Forces, Vice Admiral Dr Thomas Daum, space has now become a battlefield in its own right.
The Bundeswehr currently operates between eight and ten satellites, primarily for reconnaissance – including the SAR-Lupe and SARah systems – as well as for communications. This fleet is now considered outdated, though.
Speaking to Euronews at the Munich Security Conference, Daum said satellites are of “considerable importance for the functioning of our systems on the ground” and extend far beyond purely military use. “If satellites fail, you wouldn’t be able to withdraw cash,” he said. There is a risk that “our systems in space could be attacked”.
Against that backdrop, a “day without space” – in other words, a large-scale satellite failure – would, he warned, “essentially be a disaster”. Such an attack would deliberately disable satellites, with immediate consequences on the ground, severely disrupting critical infrastructure and key services.
Deterrence in orbit
As in other areas of defence, Berlin’s answer is deterrence. Last September, Defence Minister Boris Pistorius pledged roughly €35 billion by 2030, part of it earmarked for a space-based reconnaissance capability known as “SPOCK”, which the Bundeswehr has been using since the start of the year.
The system, built by the Finnish firm Iceye in partnership with Germany’s Rheinmetall, relies on a network of radar satellites using synthetic aperture radar (SAR). Unlike optical satellites, they can capture images of the Earth’s surface in all weather and around the clock – tracking movements and changes on the ground regardless of cloud cover or darkness.
For Daum, deterrence in space follows the same logic as on land, at sea or in the air: capability signals intent. If you show you can operate – and interfere – in orbit, you signal that an adversary’s systems are not beyond reach.
That does not necessarily mean blowing satellites out of the sky. In practice, so-called non-kinetic measures are often more relevant. Optical reconnaissance satellites, for instance, can be temporarily “blinded” from the ground by dazzling their sensors. These satellites rely on high-resolution cameras or telescopes; disrupt the sensor, and the satellite cannot see.
Another method is jamming – transmitting interference signals to disrupt communications satellites. The hardware remains intact, but its usefulness is degraded. “The impact is felt on the ground,” Daum said. “If a reconnaissance satellite can’t track the movement of your forces, you gain a tactical advantage.”
Sustainability – even in space
There are political reasons, too, why these capabilities are deliberately designed to avoid causing physical destruction. Germany signed up to the US-led Artemis Accords in 2023, committing itself to the principle of not creating space debris.
In practical terms, that means an adversary’s satellite cannot simply be shot down. The emphasis instead is on reversible measures – limiting or disrupting its use without leaving fragments in orbit. For now, that remains the official line.
But, according to Daum, there are political voices beginning to question the so-called “zero debris” principle. “Just because we have the capability to destroy a system doesn’t mean we would use it,” he told Euronews.
At the same time, he argues, demonstrating that capability sends a message. Signalling that “we possess the same capabilities as our adversaries” feeds into the logic of deterrence by punishment – the idea that an opponent must factor in the risk of retaliation.
“That can of course have a deterrent effect,” Daum said. “But it would ultimately require an adjustment of our space security strategy – and that is a political decision.”
A network of thousands of small satellites
Beyond reconnaissance, secure and resilient communications are just as critical – in peacetime as well as during crises. The Bundeswehr is heavily dependent on satellite communications. For long-distance links, it has so far relied largely on geostationary satellites, either its own or leased capacity.
If, for example, a German warship deploys from Europe to Africa, communications are routed through this infrastructure, Daum explained. The project known as “SATCOMBw Stage 4” represents the largest single space programme in the Bundeswehr’s history. Its aim is to connect tanks, ships, aircraft and troops worldwide via satellite communications – and, in particular, to secure operations on NATO’s eastern flank, including the permanently stationed German brigade in Lithuania.
Yet SATCOMBw remains a conventional system built around a small number of large satellites. It is not comparable to constellations such as Starlink, which are made up of thousands of small, interconnected satellites in low Earth orbit. Rather than relying on a handful of high-value assets, Starlink operates a dense network of smaller units that communicate with one another.
This creates far more access points and significantly increases resilience and flexibility. The strategic value of such systems has become especially clear in the war in Ukraine. Both Russia and Ukraine have, to varying degrees, relied on the satellite network operated by SpaceX in recent years – particularly for coordinating and operating drones.
Officially, Starlink services were not authorised for use in Russia. Nevertheless, from 2023 onwards, Starlink terminals began appearing with Russian units, reportedly entering the country via intermediaries in the Gulf or Central Asia.
Over the past two weeks, SpaceX has moved to block Russian forces from accessing Starlink services. Ukraine has said the restrictions have “significantly impaired” Russian operations. Moscow denies this, insisting there has been no impact on its drone warfare capabilities.
