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The writer is a former senior US National Security Council and state department official
It will be many weeks — years, in fact — before we know if Saturday’s US strikes on Iran were “very successful,” as President Donald Trump proclaimed hours after the bombs fell. The bombs hit their targets and the strikes may have set back Iran’s nuclear programme for months or even years. But that is a far cry from a guaranteed “success.”
The shortest-term questions are whether and for how long the underground enrichment site at Fordow was genuinely put out of business and how much of Iran’s stockpile of highly enriched uranium was actually destroyed. Prior to the strikes, Iran had over 400kg of HEU, probably held in relatively small canisters and potentially disbursed around the country at underground sites. If even a small part of that material survived the attack, Iran today still has enough fissile material for several nuclear bombs.
Over the longer term, the main issue will be the effect the strikes have on Iran’s nuclear ambitions. The best-case scenario would be that Iran realises the decades-long enterprise of seeking a nuclear weapons option was catastrophically counter-productive. But Iranian leaders are more likely to draw the conclusion that only nuclear weapons can protect them and fairly soon resume the process of seeking to produce them — much as Saddam Hussein did after Israel bombed his incipient nuclear programme in 1981. Iran is a country of over 90mn people, three times the size of France, with extensive nuclear knowhow that is now likely to abandon its non-proliferation commitments and refuse to allow inspections. It could thus easily resume nuclear activities unless the US and Israel are willing to bomb it over and over again.
The key to making the mission a longer-term success will be avoiding near-term military escalation that could draw the US further into the war and make a renewed Iranian nuclear weapons programme more likely. Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei had threatened the US with “irreparable damage” if Washington entered the war, but in truth his options are extremely limited. Iran’s proxy network has been degraded, its long-range ballistic missile force significantly depleted, and its own air defences destroyed, leaving it vulnerable to US or Israeli counter-attacks.
Iran still has numerous short-range missiles that could target US forces and bases in the region and mines and naval assets that could temporarily close the Strait of Hormuz, imposing pain on the west by driving up oil prices. But most of these steps would almost surely invite the powerful US retaliation that Trump has threatened. The regime’s main goal is to hold on to power, which is why it sought a potential nuclear deterrent in the first place. Responding in a way that draws the US further into the war could threaten the regime even more than losing its nuclear programme.
It is hard to imagine Iran not responding at all to an American attack on its prized nuclear facilities. It may fire more ballistic missiles at Israel, urge its proxies in Yemen, Iraq and Syria to launch some missiles or drones towards US regional bases or Israeli targets, and perhaps try to sink or capture an oil tanker, to demonstrate seriousness and preserve some credibility with its public. But if it is smart it will calibrate that response in a way designed to avoid all-out escalation, just as it did last October when Israel conducted strikes on Iranian military sites, and Iran seethed and blustered but chose not to escalate further because its options were so bad.
Of course, Iran may also opt for the opposite strategy of deliberately killing Americans and drawing the US further in, hoping that the American appetite for another costly war in the Middle East is limited, and that Trump’s Maga base will rise up in opposition if the price in blood and treasure starts to rise.
Trump himself has a huge interest in avoiding the latter scenario and can help to do so by sending the right signals to Tehran. Some will advise him that the only way to eliminate the Iranian nuclear option is to eliminate the regime but that would be the surest way to drag the US further into war.
Instead, Trump should take regime change off the table and make it clear to Iran’s leaders that they will pay an enormous price for retaliating against the US, but that de-escalation and even co-operation is still possible. If the Iranian leadership believes that “calling it” now could preserve their rule, and maybe even pave the way for sanctions relief down the road, they might just do it given how bad their other options are.
Trump’s strikes on Iran were an enormous and unnecessary gamble. But turning them into an actual success will depend on getting the momentous decisions of the next few days right.
