As the world transitioned from welcoming the new year to the first weekend of 2026, some social media users noted a sudden spike in pizza sales around the Pentagon in the early hours of Saturday morning, which was interpreted in informal online circles as a sign of imminent US action somewhere in the world.
Then came the strikes on Venezuela overnight into Saturday, surprising most, who did not expect the new year to start with the arrest of Venezuelan leader Nicolas Maduro.
The reality is, however, that there was no break: several important geopolitical developments around the year’s end have once again focused attention on US foreign policy and its implications for Washington’s allies and opponents, from Venezuela to Iran, Syria and beyond.
New Year, familiar messages
Even in the early days of the new year, US President Donald Trump did not refrain from sending explicit messages against the Islamic Republic of Iran.
His statements came alongside key developments in Latin America and Africa: from the strikes on Caracas and the fall of Maduro, to military operations against the so-called Islamic State group militants’ positions in northern Nigeria, said to be carried out at the request of the country’s government.
Some analysts have pointed out that all three countries — Iran, Venezuela, and Nigeria — as oil producers. The question now arises whether the US, in sensitive global energy market conditions, is seeking to play a more active role in the oil equation and even influence OPEC.
However, Venezuelan oil industry officials have declared that the country’s main facilities, which hold the world’s largest proven oil reserves, have not been damaged and production and refining are continuing.
The fall of Maduro is not just considered an internal upheaval in Venezuela. The event holds double significance for Tehran, as Venezuela has been a close ally of Iran in recent years, and extensive economic, oil and security cooperation has been formed between the two countries.
From the close ties between Tehran and Caracas during the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his relations with late Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez to the Iranian government’s economic and logistical plans in Venezuela.
These partnerships, which in many cases were accompanied by billions in Iranian investments, particularly from IRGC-affiliated entities, were mainly based on ideological affinity and a shared opposition to the US.
Now, with the fall of Maduro’s government, the fate of these investments and Iran’s deferred financial claims remains uncertain, even as Iran itself faces a severe economic crisis and a shortage of foreign exchange.
Protests in Iran and the shadow of developments abroad
The developments come at a time when street protests in Iran, with messages of support from Trump, have entered a fresh phase and their scope has extended to many cities in the country.
The recent protests in Iran, sparked by a deep economic crisis and the collapse of citizens’ daily livelihoods, are not considered sudden or unforeseeable events. Rather than being the result of a specific shock, this unrest is the result of a prolonged accumulation of economic pressures, chronic instability and a gradual erosion of public confidence — a crisis that could have been expected sooner or later.
Along with chronic inflation, the continuous fall in the value of the national currency and the sharp decline in purchasing power, what has increasingly fuelled the intensification of social discontent is the widespread perception of structural corruption and the deepening of the class divide in Iranian society.
A divide that is not limited only to the disparity of incomes, but is reflected in lifestyle, access to opportunities, and even in the tone and content of the official discourse of government towards citizens—a discourse that, on occasion, comes into obvious conflict with the behaviour of the political and economic elite.
The simultaneous collapse of a strategic alliance in Latin America with the intensification of unrest inside Iran cannot be considered accidental from the perspective of both domestic and foreign observers.
Especially in the wake of the 12-day conflict and what some analysts refer to as a “security gap” in Iran’s defence structure, there have been some, albeit unconfirmed, speculations about the higher vulnerability of the Islamic Republic’s leaders and, in particular, the possibility of Ali Khamenei’s physical removal in media circles.
In the same context, Iran’s leader Ali Khamenei has warned once again with the distinction between “protesters” and “agitators” that he will not back down in the face of what he calls attempts to subvert the system.
It is not clear if this positioning was set before or after the fall of Maduro’s government, but the simultaneity of the message with developments in Venezuela has been deemed significant by many.
Khamenei made the remarks Saturday morning at a meeting with the families of martyrs, reiterating that he “will bring the enemy to its knees”.
From Damascus to Caracas: The fate of Moscow’s allies
The experience of Syria and Venezuela — two countries that both enjoyed Russian political and military support — has raised fresh questions about Moscow’s role in the power equations.
Both governments, despite the support of Russian President Vladimir Putin, collapsed at short notice with momentous upheaval.
This experience has led some analysts to speak of the possibility of “bigger deals” between world powers, in which the fate of regional allies may be determined through geopolitical bargains — from Ukraine to the Middle East. In such an analysis, Iran is no exception.
Iran has become increasingly dependent on Russia in recent years, and a long-term cooperation agreement between the two countries has been signed.
However, several experts argue that these agreements do not necessarily confer lasting strategic value on the Kremlin and that, if the balance of interests shifts, Tehran could become expendable.
During the 12-day conflict, Putin’s support for Iran remained largely at the political and diplomatic level, and no sign of practical support or effective military deterrence from Moscow was seen or, at least, not reported in media.
Russia, despite its declared strategic ties with Tehran, preferred to refrain from escalating tensions with Israel and the US, limiting its role to general stances condemning attacks and inviting restraint — an approach that, from the perspective of many in Iran, once again highlighted the Kremlin’s pragmatism and prioritisation of its own interests.
Yet Tehran continues to rely on Russia, perhaps not out of deep trust, but because of a lack of alternative options in the context of sanctions and international isolation.
Interdependence in areas such as energy sales, military cooperation, the nuclear case and balancing against the West has made it inevitable for Iran.
This, even in the shadow of costly experiences and accumulated mistrust, to maintain the relationship with Moscow as a tactical partnership based on necessity and coercion more than loyalty and built on geopolitical realities — a partnership that, in particular through Iran’s cooperation with Russia in its war in Ukraine, has imposed a heavy, if not irreparable, cost on relations between Tehran and Brussels.
A frayed economy and late promises
All of these factors have cast a shadow over Iran, whose economy is under pressure from sanctions, high inflation and a sharp decline in citizens’ purchasing power.
From the perspective of many critics, the promises of officials to improve living standards are more like short-term palliatives than practical solutions—solutions that are presented late and have limited scope of effect, and recently, as the economic crisis deepens, many have gone beyond “treatment after death”.
They interpret them as ineffective remedies that until now have not been able to cure the deep-seated ailments of the Iranian economy.
The fall of governments that have had close and friendly ties to the Islamic Republic in recent years, from Bashar al-Assad in Syria to Maduro in Venezuela, inevitably raises the question of what message these developments have for Tehran.
Are these events merely a result of each country’s internal circumstances, or a sign of a shift in the approach of the great powers towards their allies? The answers to these questions remain unclear.
What seems certain, however, is that the synchronicity of external pressures, internal unrest and the collapse of allies has put the Islamic Republic at one of the most complicated political and economic junctures in recent years.
A crisis that would happen sooner than later
Iranian society today is in a contradictory situation: on one hand, it carries the historical experience of war, sanctions and foreign threats in its collective memory, and is sensitive to instability and insecurity.
On the other hand, it faces a government that, from the perspective of a significant part of the citizenry, has been highly ineffective in responding to economic demands, effectively combating corruption, and articulating a clear vision for the future; in many cases, it is both a perpetrator and an accomplice.
The simultaneity of these two factors, external pressure and internal erosion, has created an environment in which earlier crisis-management tools and social reassurance mechanisms have largely lost effectiveness.
In such circumstances, the recent economic protests cannot be seen as merely an instantaneous reaction to rising prices or currency market volatility.
More than anything else, these developments are a sign of a structural crisis that has been forming beneath the surface of society for years and now, with any economic, political or security shock, is ready to resurface.
That is perhaps the only thing Venezuela’s protesters have in common with their Iranian counterparts, as evidenced by recent remarks from the Nobel laureate and opposition leader Maria Corina Machado.
