It was alleged to be impenetrable, the steep, 21-metre (70-foot) wall of sand dotted with closely armed strongholds – making an attempt to breach it, a suicide mission.
Or so the Israelis thought.
They calculated that the Bar Lev Line, a 150km (93-mile) sand embankment that stretched from the Gulf of Suez to the Mediterranean Sea, would take 12 hours to pulverise with explosives – sufficient time to ship reinforcements.
However when the Egyptians got here on October 6, 1973, they pounded it down in simply three hours, utilizing water pumps.
“A couple of minutes after 1420 hours, because the canisters started to belch clouds of protecting smoke, our first assault wave was paddling furiously throughout the canal, their strokes falling into the rhythm of their chant, ‘Allahu Akbar…Allahu Akbar…’,” wrote Lieutenant Normal Saad el-Shazly, an Egyptian army commander at the moment, in his 1980 account of the occasions titled, The Crossing of the Suez.
“[Our] plane skimmed low over the canal, their shadows flicking throughout enemy strains as they headed deep into the Sinai,” el Shazly continued. “For the fourth time in my profession, we have been at warfare with Israel.”
The assault was timed with one other within the north, a battalion of Syrian forces that launched an assault to take again the Golan Heights.
Israeli forces have been aghast. Yom Kippur was being noticed within the Jewish state and Ramadan elsewhere within the Center East, however that didn’t deter the beginning of Operation Badr.
Driving excessive on the victory of capturing territory 4 instances its dimension within the 1967 Arab-Israeli warfare, Israel by no means anticipated an assault like this.
This primary battle spiralled into the bloody 19-day warfare identified by a number of names: the October Battle, the Yom Kippur Battle, the Ramadan Battle, or the 1973 Arab-Israeli Battle.
Fifty years later, it’s clear the warfare modified not simply the area and the way forward for Arab-Israeli relations, but in addition the world, because it rocked the orbit of the Chilly Battle, altering the US’s strategy to the Center East.
‘Egypt’s best hour’
Tewfick Aclimandos was simply 14 years outdated when the warfare started however he has vital, if imprecise, recollections of it.
Neither a hit nor a failure, it was nonetheless “Egypt’s best hour”, Aclimandos, director of the European research unit on the Egyptian Middle for Strategic Research and professor on the College of Cairo, advised Al Jazeera.
Taking again the Sinai Peninsula from Israel was a victory that cemented the Egyptian military’s would possibly beneath the management of President Anwar Sadat, he stated. It gave legitimacy to each successor of Sadat’s who took half within the warfare effort, he added.
“We’re the founding fathers, we’re the protectors of Egypt,” was the military’s messaging after taking again the Sinai, Aclimandos recalled.
It’s no marvel, then, that within the years following it, the anniversary of the warfare is widely known extensively, from free entry to army museums on October 6 to ceremonies and parades.
Simply as targeted as Cairo was on taking again Sinai, so too was Damascus on the Golan Heights. Israel had captured each within the 1967 warfare, alongside occupying what remained of Palestine.
Circumstances have been ripe for the October Battle within the Arab thoughts: An Arab entrance heading into battle to avenge the struggling of Palestinians and to take again their very own territories.
Nonetheless, the occasions of the October Battle didn’t advance the Palestinian trigger. In keeping with Sami Hamdi, the managing director at Worldwide Curiosity, a political threat agency specializing in the Center East, it was, in reality, “a powerful failure” in that regard.
“Arab states restoring justice for Palestine was fully blown aside by the October Battle,” he advised Al Jazeera.
Whereas it was believed that the 2 strongest armies within the area on the time would be capable to push again towards the Israeli occupation, the warfare as an alternative ended with Egypt normalising relations with Israel, defined Hamdi.
Cairo and Damascus waged the warfare for his or her self-interests and the Palestinian trigger was secondary, he argued.
Arab management within the area, in consequence, was fully “damaged” by the occasions of the warfare, he stated.
A united Arab entrance, splintered
The warfare demonstrated, nonetheless, {that a} united Arab entrance could possibly be leveraged to spur motion on the world stage.
When the tide of warfare turned in favour of Israel and preventing got here to an deadlock 12 days into the battle, the Arab oil-producing nations, beneath the Group of Petroleum Exporting International locations (OPEC), determined to scale back their oil manufacturing by 5 p.c.
The states declared they might preserve the identical charge of discount every month till Israeli forces withdrew from Arab territories occupied in 1967, and the rights of Palestinians have been restored. In addition they enforced an embargo on the US, suspending oil provide.
These actions had oil costs hovering – and affected the trajectory of the Chilly Battle.
The Soviets had been supplying the Arab states with weapons, whereas the US backed Israel, however the embargo had the US scrambling for options to the battle.
“This was additionally a chance to push away [the Soviets],” Yossi Mekelberg, an professional on Israel at Chatham Home, advised Al Jazeera.
Thus, Henry Kissinger swooped in, the previous US nationwide safety adviser shuttling from Cairo to Damascus, to Tel Aviv in an try and forge Arab-Israeli peace.
His “shuttle diplomacy” – as his scuttling peacemaking was termed – labored, because it introduced a ceasefire that will finish the warfare, stated Mekelberg.
Nimrod Goren, senior fellow for Israeli affairs on the Center East Institute, agreed, saying the occasions have been momentous in shifting the world from an period of warfare to an period of diplomacy,
“It was a watershed second,” he advised Al Jazeera.
However the Kissinger-fronted US diplomacy with particular person nations was precisely what splintered a united Arab entrance, stated Hamdi.
For instance, Hamdi stated, Kissinger most likely advised the Egyptians, “I can persuade the Israelis to surrender Sinai”.
As such, he made a concerted effort to construct relations primarily based on particular person pursuits that in the end outmoded pan-Arab ties, the analyst defined.
This is able to be mirrored within the coming years, notably within the Gulf Battle of 1990, stated Hamdi, when Iraq invaded Kuwait and a US-led coalition, which included different Arab states, got here to Kuwait’s defence.
The trek in the direction of Arab-Israeli peace
Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy ultimately lower Egypt off from the Arab fold when Cairo normalised relations with Israel.
Within the aftermath of the warfare, Sadat tried to interrupt the impasse of Arab-Israeli peace agreements, stated Mekelberg.
In 1977, the previous Egyptian president appeared in Jerusalem to offer a speech on peace to the Israeli parliament, the primary Arab chief to go to Israel.
That was adopted by the signing of the Camp David Accords in 1979, on the behest of US President Jimmy Carter, who invited Sadat and then-Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Start to a retreat in Washington.
The accords have been the idea for the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty – which shook Egypt unfastened from the Arab League fold.
“Egypt had bought out the Palestinians” was the frequent sentiment, stated Hamdi.
Sadat’s place, in the meantime, was that Egypt had performed its finest to combat two wars for the Palestinian trigger and couldn’t be anticipated to ship justice alone, the analyst stated.
The peace treaty, due to this fact, was to get Israel off its again, whereas its leaders and populace nonetheless harboured deep resentment in the direction of the Israeli occupation, Hamdi defined.
Israel, for its half, was additionally invested in patching issues up with Cairo – its greatest lesson from the warfare was the need of peace with its neighbours, stated Goren.
The 1967 warfare had bloated Israel’s confidence in its army would possibly, and the just lately shaped state was satisfied it was invincible, stated Mekelberg. The October Battle modified that notion rapidly.
There was little success in Arab-Israeli peace within the 50 years because the warfare, nonetheless, the Israeli-Egypt peace treaty not less than stays intact for probably the most half, Goren stated.
For the Egyptian commander on the warfare’s entrance strains, the warfare and its ensuing covenants have been justified.
“One could also be aggressive; one could have risked one’s life for one’s nation. However why ought to that predispose one to gamble with the way forward for the armed forces and the destiny of 1’s nation?” el-Shazly wrote.
